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Professor Greenawalt's perceptive Essay raises at least four issues:
the issue of what he calls modernization, the issue of standards of
interpretation, the distinction between discourse within the law and
public debate over social values, and the question of the compatibility
of hermeneutics and natural law. I would like to look briefly at each
of these issues in turn.
I.
Professor Greenawalt is suspicious of the idea that literary critics
and lawyers should always try to interpret texts or laws in ways that
show their relevance or application to a modern audience or citizenry.
Moreover, he denies that it is always inappropriate to attempt simply
to reconstruct an author's original intentions or the original intent of
a law. I do not disagree. Rather, I want to emphasize that both
conscious efforts at modernization and conscious efforts at reconstruc-
tion are subject to hermeneutic conditions insofar as both are
historically situated. The point, in other words, is not that we should
always try to show the modern relevance of a text or law or that we
should always reconstruct original intentions. Rather, to the extent
that we try to understand a text or a law at all, we are interested in
what it says or means. But texts and text-analogues do not say or
mean in a vacuum. They say something to someone or fail to do so.
Hence, to the extent that we try to understand, we try to understand
what a text or law means to us, given our situation and the concerns
and questions that orient our appropriation of the text or law in
question. As Gadamer puts the point, understanding is always already
application.'
The hermeneutic approach I am proposing does not deny the
difference between interpreting existing law and making new law.
Still, that distinction is often confused with the distinction between
1. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 308 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989) (1960).
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interpretive judgments with which one agrees and interpretive
judgments from which one dissents. Interpretation, as Professor
Greenawalt argues, involves judgment and, I would add, application
in which one has to understand what the law says with regard to the
issue or circumstance that motivates looking to the law in the first
place. Passing a new welfare law is distinct from trying to understand
what the old one means. But we also have to understand what the
new one means and in trying to do so we cannot avoid interpreting
it from the point of view of specific questions, interests, and concerns.
II.
Professor Greenawalt raises two questions with regard to the
standards I ascribe to interpretation. First, he points out that the
hermeneutic notion of the unity of part and whole may not make
sense when applied to the law. Second, he questions whether the
second standard I proposed, that of illumination, makes sense at all.
I think I can best try to clarify my claim by returning to the issue of
affirmative action. The interpretive claim I want to make points to the
one-sidedness of a critique of affirmative action that understands the
meaning of equal opportunity only in terms that require strict racial
and gender neutrality in hiring and admissions decisions. Such an
understanding assumes that civil rights struggles were limited to
ending discrimination and thereby overlooks Supreme Court decisions
from the case of Sweatt v. Painter2 through the school busing cases,
decisions which spoke not only to the end of legal segregation but
also to full integration and participation for groups previously denied
an equal part in American institutions and practices. To the extent
that the critique of affirmative action fails to incorporate this part of
the record into its understanding, its interpretation of equal oppor-
tunity is less adequate than one that does since it fails to unify all the
parts of the text of our civil rights struggles with the whole. To be
sure, a defense of affirmative action that overlooks the connection
between equal opportunity and racial and gender neutrality is equally
one-sided and inadequate. Indeed, the current concern with the extent
to which women and minorities are stigmatized within the institutions
and practices into which they have been admitted indicates the
strength of the connection between equal opportunity and neutrality.
An interpretation of equal opportunity that encompasses both
neutrality and participation might succeed in unifying all parts of the
civil rights record, struggles, and decisions. Such an interpretation,
moreover, might indicate that the solution to unequal racial and
2. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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gender participation is not an end to affirmative action but its
supplementation with all the remedial, educational, and sensitivity
programs necessary to erase the presumption that women and
minorities are not as qualified as the white men who occupy the same
positions.
The second criterion of interpretation I examined, that of illumina-
tion, is harder to defend. The attempt here is to discover if the
understanding of meaning can ever see through its own dogmatism
where it is dogmatic and the problem with dogmatism is that it may
be opaque to itself, unifying part and whole only by employing a kind
of Procrustean bed that mangles the meaning of the parts to fit with
an unchanging and adamant conception of the whole. The idea is that
an interpretive understanding can overcome dogmatism only to the
extent that it recognizes its interpretive elements and is open to the
possibility that the text or text-analogue is other than what its
assumptions first supposed. I have tried to cash out this idea in terms
of a condition that genuine understanding involves, namely that one
allows, in advance, for the possibility that the text or text-analogue
might undermine one's prejudices and require one to rethink that
which one thought one already knew. In the case of the man who
interprets a woman's attempt to reject a sexual advance as an attempt
to welcome it, the second criterion of adequate interpretation would
ask him to be open to the possibility that he does not know what he
thinks he knows or as Gadamer puts the point, "a person trying to
understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something."3
Professor Greenawalt points out that this second criterion of
legitimate interpretation would seem to lead to a peculiar relativism.
One interpreter possesses an understanding of a text or text analogue
which allows him or her to rethink some of his or her assumptions
about it or the issues it addresses. However, a second interpreter with
the same interpretation already knows what the first interpreter has
to learn and hence, from this second interpreter's point of view, the
interpretation remains inadequate. But the second criterion of under-
standing is not meant to deny that an understanding of meaning that
confirms one's prejudices is illegitimate. It is meant to allow one to
discriminate the cases in which one has simply imposed one's
prejudices on a text or text-analogue and the cases in which one has
rethought through them in the light of the text or text-analogue.
3. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 269.
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III.
The third issue that Professor Greenawalt raises involves the
difference between legal discussion and the larger public debate, a
similar difference to the one that Habermas describes as the dif-
ference between institutionalized discourse and a weak public sphere.
My concern here has to do with the sluiceways between the two.
Clearly the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade did not resolve
the public debate over abortion. Instead, the larger public debate has
required that the Supreme Court revisit and continue to revisit its
decision. Our discourse about already guaranteed legal rights is not
always or necessarily separate from a public debate about what those
rights mean in which the legal and public debate mutually inform one
another. The current cases before the Supreme Court concerning
physician-assisted suicide seems to be a case in point insofar as at
least one legal opinion holds that the Court ought not decide the issue
until the public has more thoroughly discussed it and public sentiment
is more settled than it now appears to be.
IV.
The last issue Professor Greenawalt raises directly concerns the
relation between hermeneutics and natural law. Here he seems to me
to have articulated the relation well in moving from thick conceptions
of law and morality that are particular to different cultures to what
Michael Walzer calls thinner conceptions that every culture or at least
almost every culture shares, such as the prohibition of the intentional
killing of innocent citizens.4 "We are capable of perceiving some
transcultural truths," Professor Greenawalt writes, "and our explana-
tions of these will be comprehensible to members of other cultures,
albeit their understanding will never be precisely the same as ours."5
What interests me is just this possibility of legitimate differences in
our understanding. We can admit that allegiance to universal aspects
of morality does not rule out some legitimate differences between
cultures as to how those aspects are best understood and articulated
in their laws and cultural norms. We might also admit that our
common allegiance to our own laws and norms does not rule out
some legitimate differences between ourselves as to how those laws
and norms are best understood and articulated in our practices. To
say that some of our differences reflect legitimate differences in
4. See MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
(1994).
5. Kent Greenawalt, Interpretation and Judgment, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 415, 432 (1997).
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understanding does not presume that all our differences are legitimate
or that we cannot rationally discriminate between culturally based
understandings. Rather, there is an alternative to both the relativistic
idea that any understanding of law or principle is legitimate and the
dogmatic idea that only one is. Some different legitimate understan-
dings of moral and legal principles remain possible and we might try
to accommodate this pluralism both in our debates and, as far as
possible, in our policies.
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